research output by categories in reversed chronological order.

published articles

Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Others are Doing
(with Karl Schlag) [link] [pdf] accepted at Management Science

  • I talk about this paper in an episode of Game Changer, the podcast by TWS Partners.

When Can Auctions Maximize Post-Auction Welfare?
[link] [pdf], International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 89, Article 102972, July, 2023

  • The paper was cited in the scientific background on the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
  • An earlier version was awarded the 2017 Heinz König Young Scholar Award of ZEW Mannheim

On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Theoretical Economics, 14 (4), 1271–1308, 2019 (with Maarten Janssen) [link] [pdf]

book chapters

Budget Constraints in Combinatorial Clock Auctions
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler, and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017 (with Maarten Janssen and Vladimir Karamychev) [link] [pdf]

working papers

An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics
[pdf] r&r at American Economic Review

Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information
(with Kyle Woodward) [arXiv] [pdf] r&r at Journal of Economic Theory

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
(with Alexander Teytelboym) [arXiv] [pdf]

Algorithmic Cooperation
(with Simon Martin, Hans-Theo Normann and Tobias Werner) [SSRN] [pdf][online appendix]