On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Theoretical Economics, 14 (4), 1271–1308, 2019 (with Maarten Janssen)

Budget Constraints in Combinatorial Clock Auctions
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Martin Bichler, and Jacob Goeree (eds), Cambridge University Press, 2017 (with Maarten Janssen, and Vladimir Karamychev)

Working papers

An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics, 2020

Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Others are Doing, 2020 (with Karl Schlag)

When Can Auctions Maximize Post-Auction Welfare?, 2020

  • The paper was cited in the scientific background on the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences.
  • An earlier version was awarded the 2017 Heinz König Young Scholar Award of ZEW Mannheim